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Chapter 1
Introduction
The impact of alcohol consumption on the social and economic environment is a topic of ﬁerce
debate in many countries. As usually the only legally distributed leisure drug, production,
sales and even consumption of alcohol is often heavily regulated. Advocates of regulations
seemingly have a strong case, as alcohol consumption has a number of adverse eﬀects, both
to the consumer and to society. Direct health risks to the consumer include cardiovascular
disease, cirrhosis, cancer, depression, and even increased risk of suicide (Storvoll et al., 2010,
Chapter 3). Alcohol consumption during pregnancy can have inhibiting eﬀects on fetal
development as well as adult outcomes for the child (Nilsson, 2008). Furthermore, alcohol
consumption is related to increased risk of traﬃc accidents, both to the consumer and others,
as well as criminal activity and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
In Norway, alcohol is strictly regulated. Limiting alcohol consumption is explicitly stated
as a purpose of the law regulating alcohol, as a means of limiting the harm caused by alcohol
consumption. The main policy tool is restricting alcohol access. Access is restricted in many
ways, both through price, time, and location restrictions.
The adverse eﬀects of alcohol do not automatically justify the regulations observed in
Norway and many other countries. In this thesis, I ﬁrst look at why regulations on alcohol
could be justiﬁed. I argue that restrictions on alcohol could be welfare improving if there are
negative externalities from alcohol consumption or if people have time inconsistent prefer-
ences. The external costs from alcohol consumption are not incorporated into the decisions on
how much alcohol to consume exactly because they are external to the consumers making the
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decisions. An unregulated market therefore leads to a too high alcohol consumption relative
to the social optimum. If people have time inconsistent preferences, they are unable to follow
their optimal consumption paths, and restrictions on alcohol could be welfare improving. I
distinguish between naive and sophisticated consumers. While the naive consumers are bliss-
fully unaware of their time inconsistencies, the sophisticated agents are able to accurately
predict how their future preferences diverges from their current preferences, and they are
eager to restrict their future selves in order to follow their preferred consumption paths from
the present point of view. There is scope for improving welfare for both types, but while the
naive can only be forced towards his optimal consumption path, the sophisticated agent
can deliberately use policies as commitment devices in order to (at least partially) overcome
his self control problems.
I then look at how diﬀerent alcohol regulations could be welfare improving. Speciﬁcally,
I look at restrictions on price, time, and location. If alcohol consumption entails a nega-
tive consumption externality, Pigouvian taxes improve welfare by forcing the consumers to
internalize the external costs resulting from their alcohol consumption. To the naive time
inconsistent consumer, restrictions on alcohol could be welfare improving by forcing him
closer to his optimal consumption path than what he is able to achieve by the means of his
insuﬃcient self control. To the sophisticated time inconsistent agent, a policy forming a com-
mitment device could increase his long term utility by allowing him to restrict the choice set
of his future selves. I argue that time and location restrictions could form such commitment
devices for the sophisticated time inconsistent consumers, and that even a short extra travel
time to the nearest alcohol outlet could decrease alcohol consumption considerably.
Next, I turn to testing empirically the prediction that travel times aﬀect alcohol consump-
tion negatively using unique data from Norway. Norway is a large country divided by long
fjords and rugged mountains. Oﬀ premise sales of beverages with a higher alcohol content
than 4.7 percent by volume is only legal through a state monopoly (Vinmonopolet), and
a license is required for all other alcohol sales, both oﬀ and on premise. Due to a limited
number of Vinmonopolet outlets, there are large variations in travel times to the nearest
outlet. In order to investigate the eﬀect of travel times to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet
on alcohol consumption, it is not meaning full to look at cross sections. Alcohol consumption
may vary between cities and the country side, as does travel times to the nearest alcohol
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outlet. I therefore exploit variations in travel times to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet due
to the openings of a number of outlets between 2000 and 2012.
I use data on travel times between municipalities and sales data from both Vinmonopolet
and other enterprises where alcohol sales are possible. During the period 138 new state
monopoly outlets opened. Of these 118 opened in municipalities without a previous outlet.
Mean travel times decreased by almost 10 minutes.
I exploit the variation in travel times between Vinmonopolet outlets and their customer
bases due to the increased number of outlets, to investigate the eﬀect of travel times on per
person alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet. I use a ﬁxed eﬀects model to explain changes in
per person alcohol sales by changes in travel times. I ﬁnd a negative and highly signiﬁcant
relationship between mean travel time from Vinmonopolet outlets to its customer bases and
the per person alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet. In particular, I ﬁnd that a ten minute
decrease in mean travel time in the customer base is related to an increase in per person
alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet of 0.36 liters of pure alcohol per year. This is a 7.4 percent
increase relative to the mean per person total alcohol sales between 2000 and 2010.
The eﬀects of changes in travel time on alcohol sales are likely to diﬀer between people,
depending on their initial travel time to the nearest outlet. I therefore estimate some other
speciﬁcations to allow for a non-linear relationship. First, I include travel time squared in
my regression equation. This gives the expected signs and highly signiﬁcant estimates for
both the linear and squared coeﬃcient. Using this model, I predict the eﬀect of a ten minute
decrease in mean travel time from the year 2000 mean travel time. A ten minute decrease in
travel time is related to an increase in per person alcohol sales of 0.54 liters of pure alcohol
per year.
I then estimate the model using the log of travel time. Again, the estimates are highly
signiﬁcant. The predicted increase in per person yearly alcohol sales from a ten minute
decrease in travel time from the year 2000 mean travel time, is then 0.43 liters of pure
alcohol.
Finally, I estimate a model where I allow for a linear relationship that diﬀers between
outlets for which the customer bases have diﬀerent mean travel times. For the outlets with
mean travel time below or equal to 30 minutes, I ﬁnd that a ten minute decrease in mean
travel time is related to an increase in per person alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet of 0.66
3
liters of pure alcohol per year. This is a 13.6 percent increase relative to the 2000-2010 mean
of total per person annual alcohol sales. The estimate is highly signiﬁcant. For the outlets
with mean travel time between 30 and 60 minutes, a ten minute decrease in mean travel time
is related to a highly signiﬁcant increase in per person sales from Vinmonopolet by 0.36 liters
of pure alcohol per year. For the last group of outlets, those with mean travel time for the
customers above 60 minutes, the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant, and it is quite small. In all the
speciﬁcations, travel times to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet are thus negatively related to
per person alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet. The eﬀect of changes in travel time is smaller
the higher are initial travel times.
These ﬁndings do not necessarily mean that shorter travel times are related to higher
total per person alcohol consumption. Rather, it could be that the travel time to the nearest
Vinmonopolet outlet only aﬀects the composition of diﬀerent forms of alcohol consumption.
To investigate the possibility of substitution, I look at the eﬀect of changes in travel time to
the nearest Vinmonopolet outlets on per person alcohol sales through other channels than
Vinmonopolet. The types of enterprises with potential to obtain licenses for alcohol sales are
pubs and restaurants (on premise licenses) and grocery stores (oﬀ premise licenses). If there
is substitution between alcohol from these sources and alcohol from the state monopoly, we
would expect the relationship between the travel time to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet
and sales from pubs, restaurants, and grocery stores to be positive. For restaurants, the rela-
tionship is in fact positive. A ten minute decrease in travel time to the nearest Vinmonopolet
outlet is related to a 22.2 NOK yearly decrease in per person sales from restaurants and cafes.
However, this only to a very little extent compensates for the estimated increases in sales
from Vinmonopolet, and the estimate is not signiﬁcant.
For grocery stores and bars, there is a negative relationship between per person sales and
the mean travel time to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet in the customer bases. For bars,
the estimate is very small and insigniﬁcant. A ten minute decrease in mean travel time is
related to a 2.46 NOK increase in per person yearly sales. For grocery stores, the estimate
is higher and highly signiﬁcant. A ten minute decrease in mean travel time for the customer
bases of grocery stores is related to a 209 NOK increase in per person sales per year. This in
turn leads to a negative relationship between total per person sales and travel time, as sales
from grocery stores constitute most of the total per person sales. A ten minute decrease in
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travel time is related to a 171 NOK increase in total yearly per person sales. This could be
due to a complementarity between alcohol acquired through diﬀerent channels. However, it
is also possible that sales in grocery stores are positively aﬀected by increased proximity to
a Vinmonopolet outlet, because people shop at grocery stores close to Vinmonopolet outlets
while they are in the neighborhood.
Decreases in mean travel time thus seem to be related to not only an increase in alcohol
sales from Vinmonopolet, but to an increase in actual alcohol consumption, as there is little
evidence of substitution from alcohol from other sources.

In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I discuss alcohol consumption and regulations in general. In Chapter
2, I present some of the adverse eﬀects of alcohol consumption. In particular, direct health
eﬀects on the person consuming alcohol, eﬀects of pregnant women's alcohol consumption,
labor market outcomes, and crime eﬀects. In Chapter 3, I present theory on externalities
and time inconsistent preferences suggesting that restrictions on alcohol may improve welfare.
Chapter 4 discusses how price, time, and location restrictions may improve welfare in the
cases discussed in Chapter 3.
I then turn to an empirical investigation of regulation and consumption in Norway specif-
ically. In Chapter 5, I present the historical and institutional background of consumption
and regulations in Norway. Chapter 6 presents the data I use and some descriptive statistics.
In Chapter 7, I present the empirical strategy, and the main results are presented in Chapter
8. Chapter 9 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Adverse eﬀects of alcohol consumption
There are a number of adverse eﬀects from alcohol consumption. In this chapter, I discuss
some of them. I categorize these eﬀects into direct health eﬀects, eﬀects on children's health,
eﬀects on labor market outcomes, and eﬀects on crime. By direct health eﬀects, I mean
eﬀects on the health of the individual consuming alcohol. In the section on children's health,
I discuss only how pregnant women's alcohol consumption may be harmful for the fetus,
although parents' alcohol consumption may of course aﬀect their children after they are born
as well.
Direct health eﬀects
It is widely accepted that alcohol consumption has a number of adverse health eﬀects to
the consumer. Alcohol consumption can lead to addiction, and it increases the risk of other
diseases, some potentially fatal. These include cardiovascular disease, diﬀerent forms of
cancer, epilepsy, cirrhosis, and depression. Alcohol intoxication leads to impaired balance
and movement skills and to a lengthened reaction time. This in turn increases the risk of
accidents. Alcohol consumption is related to an increased risk of traﬃc accidents as well as
fall accidents. Furthermore, alcohol abuse increases the risk of mortality by suicide (Rossow,
1996, Storvoll et al., 2010, Chapter 3, Babor et al., 2010, Chapter 2).
While a sustained high or moderate alcohol consumption without notable intoxication
can lead to addiction and cirrhosis, some adverse eﬀects are related to the amount consumed
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on each occasion. These are eﬀects that work through acute intoxication and include acci-
dents and violence (Babor et al., 2010, Chapter 2). Drinking pattern, in addition to total
consumption therefore plays a role in determining the adverse eﬀects of alcohol consumption.
Using data from WHO in 2002, Rehm et al. (2006) estimate the fractions of European
deaths that are due to alcohol consumption. They construct a measure of alcohol at-
tributable fractions (AAFs) based on data on drinking patterns and the risk of diﬀerent
diseases for diﬀerent drinking patterns. The AAF is a measure of the share of disease that
would disappear with no alcohol consumption. They estimate that 6,1 percent of all Euro-
pean deaths are due to alcohol consumption.
Eﬀects on children's health
Alcohol consumption during pregnancy can harm the fetus. Fetal alcohol syndrome is a
pattern of birth defects caused by mothers' alcohol consumption during pregnancy. Charac-
teristics of the fetal alcohol syndrome include stunted growth, abnormal facial characteristics,
and brain damage. Furthermore, alcohol consumption during pregnancy is related to prema-
ture birth, low birth weight and an increased risk of miscarriage (Storvoll et al., 2010, p. 55,
Andersen et al., 2012).
There is also evidence that mothers' alcohol consumption during pregnancy aﬀect their
children's adult outcomes. Nilsson (2008) investigates the eﬀect of increased alcohol availabil-
ity, following a policy change in Sweden, on education and work outcomes for those exposed
to the policy while in utero. He exploits a policy experiment in two Swedish regions in 1967
where alcohol availability increased temporarily. During the experiment, regular grocery
stores were allowed to sell strong beer (beer with a alcohol content of less than 5.6 percent
by volume1). Before and after the experiment and in the other regions in Sweden, only the
state run oﬀ premise alcohol monopoly, Systembolaget, was allowed to sell beverages with
a higher alcohol content than 3.5 percent. Only people above the age of 21 were allowed
to buy alcohol from Systembolaget, whereas the age limit in grocery stores was 16. The
experiment increased the availability of lower alcohol content beverages for those above 21
years old, which was an intended outcome. For those between 16 and 21 years old, however,
1Throughout this thesis, references to alcohol contents are always alcohol content by volume.
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availability of beer with a higher alcohol content increased.
Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy, Nilsson ﬁnds that those children exposed to
the experiment while in utero have fewer years of schooling, lower high school and college
graduation rates, are less likely to be employed, and have lower earnings than cohorts in
utero before and after the experiment and in the other regions during the experiment. The
number of years of schooling was 0.27 years lower for the treatment group, with larger eﬀects
for males than for females. Children in the treatment group were less likely to complete high
school, by 4 percentage points. Finally, the exposed cohorts had 24 percent lower earnings
on average.
Labor market outcomes
Johansson et al. (2012) ﬁnd that work absence increased as a result of increased alcohol
availability in Sweden. They look at the eﬀect of a cut in the Finnish alcohol tax in 2004
on mortality, alcohol related illnesses, and work absence in Swedish regions near the Finnish
border relative to other regions in the north of Sweden. The Finnish tax cut led to large
diﬀerences in liquor prices between Finland and Sweden. The sales of liquor grew throughout
Finland, but the growth was much larger in the regions close to the Swedish border, indicating
cross border shopping. They use a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy and ﬁnd that work
absence increased by 12.5 percent for females and by 5.3 percent for males. For mortality
and hospitalization, however, their estimates are small and imprecise.
Crime
There is a large literature on the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime. A
relationship between criminal violence and alcohol consumption has been established (Room
and Rossow, 2001). Rossow and Norström (2011) investigate the impact of changes in bar
closing hours on the number of reported assaults, using a ﬁxed eﬀects model. They look at 18
Norwegian cities where closing hours changed between 2000 and 2010. Their outcome variable
is the number of reported assaults in the city center during weekends at night time (10 pm
to 5 am). They include the number of assaults outside the city center as a control variable.
They ﬁnd that each extra trading hour increased reported assaults by 16 percent. They also
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ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of trading hours was symmetrical, ie. extensions and restrictions in
trading hours had similar impacts.
Markowitz et al. (2012) study the eﬀects of alcohol control policies on self reported vi-
olent crime in the U.S. They look at the eﬀect of sixteen diﬀerent alcohol control policies.
These include the number of liquor outlets per 1000 residents, drunk driving laws, alcohol
price, and Sunday sales restrictions. They propose that an act of violence is a function of
the alcohol consumption of the potential victim as well as alcohol consumption of the poten-
tial perpetrator, and that alcohol consumption in turn is a function of alcohol policy. They
use a linear probability model to explain acts of violence by alcohol price and other alcohol
control policies, using individual ﬁxed eﬀects and controlling for a number of characteristics
associated with crime. They ﬁnd a negative, but statistically insigniﬁcant, relationship be-
tween alcohol prices and the probability of being assaulted, and they ﬁnd only small and
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on the other alcohol control policies. They then restrict the sample
to only self reported assaults involving observed alcohol or drug use by the oﬀender. They
then ﬁnd that a 1$ increase in beer price is associated with a 0.06 percentage point increase
in the probability of being assaulted in a six month period. The result is signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level.
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Chapter 3
Why regulate alcohol?
There is a general consensus that there are negative eﬀects from alcohol consumption. This
fact, however, is not in itself reason enough to justify regulations. When making decisions
about how much to consume, a rational and informed agent will take account of health eﬀects,
increased risk of accidents when driving, reduced ability to earn income etc. Yet, alcohol is
heavily regulated in many countries. In this chapter, I discuss why state interference in the
market may be justiﬁed. I present economic theory suggesting that an unregulated marked
for alcohol may lead to non-optimal consumption, leaving scope for welfare improvement
from regulations.
3.1 Externalities
The ﬁrst argument for regulating alcohol is the presence of externalities. An action creates
an externality if it aﬀects someone with whom the decision maker has not engaged in a
related market transaction (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008). That is, a party other than
those choosing to perform the action is aﬀected by it. The eﬀect could be either positive or
negative.
Let us think of an externality resulting from the consumption of alcohol. The externality
is something which aﬀects a third party: someone who is not the buyer (the consumer) or the
seller of the good. The positive and negative eﬀects to the buyer or seller will be incorporated
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into the agreement on price (assuming they are aware of the eﬀects). However, the buyer
and seller do not take the external eﬀect into account when deciding how much to buy and
sell, and at what price, as they only maximize their own utility or proﬁts. The externality
is thus a link between economic agents that lies outside the price system of the economy
(Hindriks and Myles, 2006). If the externality is positive (a beneﬁt), an unregulated market
will lead to a lower consumption than the social optimum. If the externality is negative (a
cost), an unregulated market will lead to a higher consumption than the social optimum.
To show this, I use a simple economic model. Each individual has utility function u(ci)
where ci is individual i's consumption of alcohol. I assume conventional properties for the
utility function:
∂ui
∂ci
> 0 ,
∂2ui
∂c2i
< 0.
Individual i's alcohol consumption also causes some per unit cost α to society. Ie. there is
a negative externality from alcohol consumption. I assume that α is constant and the same
for all consumers. For simplicity, I let the supply curve be perfectly elastic.
Individual i takes the market price p as given, and his budget constraint takes the form
cip 6 yi. His optimization problem becomes
maxciu(ci) st. cip = yi.
All individuals maximize utility and consume until u′(ci) = p. That is, until their private
marginal beneﬁt from alcohol consumption equals the price they face. This gives a standard
market equilibrium. In an unregulated market the private marginal beneﬁt will equal the
private marginal cost, and a quantity q1 will be sold at price p1, as shown in Figure 3.1.
The social marginal beneﬁt from alcohol consumption is not equal to the private marginal
beneﬁt however. The social marginal beneﬁt from individual i's consumption is u′(ci) − α.
In the social optimum, individual i's consumption is given by
u′(ci)− α = p, (3.1)
where u′(ci) − α is the social marginal beneﬁt of individual i's consumption. Using this
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Figure 3.1: Externality from alcohol consumption
Social and private marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost with a negative consumption externality from alcohol
consumption.
and equation (3.1), we get that the social marginal beneﬁt of the alcohol consumption of
consumer i should equal the marginal cost of his consumption. The social optimal quantity
is thus q∗, as shown in Figure 3.1, given by the equality of the marginal cost and the social
marginal beneﬁt. Since each individual consumer does not bear the external costs of their
consumption, they do not take it into account when deciding on how much to consume.
This leads to over consumption from a social perspective. The excess consumption in the
unregulated market is q1 − q∗.
It is easy to think how the adverse eﬀects described in Chapter 2 can, at least partially,
be external to the individuals deciding how much to consume. For instance, people who
consume alcohol may to some extent take into account the costs from their increased health
risk. However, they may not take into account (or even be aware of) the costs from their
alcohol related damages induced on the government; hospital and rehabilitation expenditures
etc. The drunk driver may take into account his own increased risk of an accident, when
deciding whether to drink and drive, but he may not take into account the increased risk he
imposes on all other drivers and pedestrians in his path. People committing crimes when
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under the inﬂuence may take into account their risk and costs of being caught and punished,
but not the costs to society from litigation, police work, administrating prisons etc.
3.2 Time inconsistency and self control problems
The second justiﬁcation for public regulations on alcohol that I propose in this thesis is that
people may have self control problems. In this section, I argue that if people have self control
problems, public regulation could increase welfare by acting as a commitment device for
the consumers or even by forcing consumers closer to their optimal consumption paths in a
merely paternalistic way.
I follow O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and model the self control problems, using present
biased time inconsistent preferences. The present bias means that the consumer puts larger
weight on the present relative to the future. With time inconsistent preferences, the choices
which maximize utility are diﬀerent depending on what point in time they are evaluated at.
People with time inconsistent preferences have self control problems. They are able to make
an optimal plan for the future. However, they are not able to stick with their plan, because
what seemed optimal at the time of planning no longer seems optimal when the actions
have to be performed. Speciﬁcally, in the case of alcohol consumption, what the consumer
perceives to be his optimal consumption path changes over time.
In this section, assume that consumers get some utility from consuming alcohol today,
but are also aware of some costs occurring in the future related to alcohol consumption.
The costs from alcohol consumption could be any of the negative eﬀects related to alcohol
consumption discussed in Chapter 2, but I think the most straight forward way to think of
the cost in the model I present is as a hangover. You enjoy consuming alcohol today, but
you must bear the cost tomorrow of a hangover.
Alcohol consumption in this set up entails an immediate reward and a delayed cost.
Or, equivalently, restricting own consumption entails an immediate cost, the cost of not
consuming as much as you want, and a delayed reward, the reward of avoiding the hangover.
Due to his present bias, the consumer will always want to start the healthy lifestyle tomorrow
rather than today, or to be more healthy tomorrow relative to today. The cost of being
healthy relative to the reward seems higher when the cost is borne today and the beneﬁt
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comes tomorrow, than when the cost and reward are both borne in the future.
Model
I use a model with quasi hyperbolic discounting. Speciﬁcally I use a (β, δ)-model where the
intertemporal preference function
Ut = ut + β
T∑
s=t+1
δ
s−t
us
follows O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Ut is the intertemporal preferences from the perspec-
tive of period t, ut are the instantaneous preferences in period t. 0 < β < 1 is a discount
factor which represents a bias toward the present. If β = 1 there is no time inconsistency.
δ is the time consistent discount factor. In my model I assume δ = 1 for simplicity. When
δ = 1 the agent only distinguishes between the present and the future. He does not discount
between future periods. The consumer in this model only cares about alcohol consumption
and does not get utility from any other source. I assume that instantaneous utility in period
t is a function of alcohol consumption in period t and alcohol consumption in period t− 1:
ut = u(ct, ct−1)
where
∂ut
∂ct
> 0 ,
∂2ut
∂c2t
< 0
and
∂ut
∂ct−1
< 0 ,
∂2ut
∂c2t−1
> 0.
Consumption today entails a reward today, and the marginal reward is decreasing in con-
sumption. Consumption today also entails a cost tomorrow, and the marginal addition to
this cost is increasing in consumption. I talk about period t as today and period t + 1 as
tomorrow, though these periods could of course represent some other time intervals.
I make a few assumptions for simplicity. First, I assume that the agent is free to save
and borrow as he pleases at an interest rate equal to 0. Furthermore, I assume that the
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monetary of cost of alcohol, p, is constant. I denote his lifetime income by M . Since he can
save and borrow at no interest rate, it is irrelevant when the income is received. Using these
assumptions, I can state his lifetime budget constraint
p
T∑
s=t
cs 6M
which further gives his maximization problem
max U st. p
T∑
s=t
cs = M
where he maximizes with respect to consumption in all periods from t to T . The consumer
makes a decision every day about how much to consume on that day.
This gives the ﬁrst order conditions
∂ut
∂ct
+ βδ
∂ut+1
∂ct
− λp = 0
βδ
∂ut+1
∂ct+1
+ βδ2
∂ut+2
∂ct+1
− λp = 0.
Combining these gives me the consumption Euler equation
∂ut
∂ct
+ β
∂ut+1
∂ct
= β
(
∂ut+1
∂ct+1
+
∂ut+2
∂ct+1
)
. (3.2)
From equation (3.2), it is evident that in period t the consumer puts less weight on the cost
relative to the beneﬁt of today's consumption than he does with tomorrow's consumption.
The preferred consumption in period t is therefore larger than the preferred consumption
in period t + 1 as seen from period t. Clearly, this is also the case for periods t and t + r.
The distinction here is between the present and the future only, not between future periods.
Remember that I assumed that δ = 1.
Now, let us look at the consumption Euler equation between periods t+ 1 and t+ 2, still
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from the point of view of period t. Again, I use the ﬁrst order conditions
βδ
∂ut+1
∂ct+1
+ βδ2
∂ut+2
∂ct+1
− λp = 0
βδ2
∂ut+2
∂ct+2
+ βδ3
∂ut+3
∂ct+2
− λp = 0
to ﬁnd the Euler equation
∂ut+1
∂ct+1
+
∂ut+2
∂ct+1
=
∂ut+2
∂ct+2
+
∂ut+3
∂ct+2
. (3.3)
It is now evident that in period t the preferred consumption in periods t + 1 and t + 2 is
the same. Again, the relationship is the same for periods t + 1 and t + r. The optimal
consumption as seen from period t is thus the same for all future periods.
Preferred and actual consumption paths
In period t, the agent wants to consume according to the Euler equations (3.2) and (3.3).
However, in period t+ 1, when he makes the decision about whether to drink and how much,
the Euler equation describing the consumption in periods t+ 1 and t+ 2 has become
∂ut+1
∂ct+1
+ β
∂ut+2
∂ct+1
= β
(
∂ut+2
∂ct+2
+
∂ut+3
∂ct+2
)
.
Since β < 1, the agent once again puts less weight on the future and regards the cost relative
to the beneﬁt of current consumption to be smaller than the cost relative to the beneﬁt of
future consumption. This is because both the cost and the beneﬁt of future consumption are
discounted, whereas only the cost and not the beneﬁt of current consumption is discounted.
As it turns out, he does not in period t+ 1 act according to the plan he made in period t.
Figure 3.2 shows the preferred consumption path from the point of view of period t. As is
evident from the ﬁgure, the preferred consumption path in period t is one with a (relatively)
high consumption in period t and a lower and constant consumption in all other periods.
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Figure 3.2: Preferred consumption path, period t perspective
However, the decisions about how much to consume in the future periods are made in the
respective periods, and by the time the decisions are to be made the world has changed.
Following O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), suppose there is a period 0 where the agent
does not make a decision and puts the same weight on all future periods. This can be
used to ﬁnd the long run utility from doing something (consuming) in period t and make
welfare analyses by comparing the long run utilities. In the model above, it is optimal from
the period 0 perspective to consume the same amount in all periods, since the period 0
perspective weighs the utility costs relative to the utility gains of consumption equally in all
periods. Policies that help consumers reach their period 0 optimal consumption path could
then increase welfare.
In period 0, all periods are weighted the same and there is no consumption decision. The
consumer therefore weighs the costs and the beneﬁts from alcohol consumption equally. Since
his period utility function u(·) is the same in all periods, his optimal consumption path is
one with constant consumption. In period t the consumer discounts the cost but not the
beneﬁt from current consumption, and he discounts both the cost and the beneﬁt of future
consumption. He therefore wants a higher consumption today and a lower and constant
consumption in all future periods. In period t+ 1, however, the consumer wants to consume
at a higher level in period t+ 1 and then a lower and constant level for all remaining periods.
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The history then repeats itself again and again. In period t+2, the world has again changed,
and the agent has a new preferred consumption path. His actual consumption path will then
be one where the consumption in each period is equal to the optimal consumption in that
period from the point of view of the respective period.
The consumer reconsiders his preferred consumption path in period t + 1 and all future
periods. In period t + 1 he wishes to consume more than what he considered to be the
optimal t+ 1-consumption in period t. But he did not budget for this, and in order to aﬀord
a higher consumption today he will have to (slightly) lower his consumption in all future
periods. Next period he again has to lower his planned future consumption path in order to
aﬀord a higher current consumption than what he planned and budgeted for. The preferred
consumption paths are shown in Figure 3.3a, and the corresponding actual consumption path
is shown in Figure 3.3b. Due to ﬁnancial constraints, consumption at some point falls below
the preferred consumption path from the point of view of period t, that is the path shown in
Figure 3.2.
Naive and sophisticated agents
I now distinguish between two diﬀerent types of time inconsistent agents, following O'Donoghue
and Rabin (1999), the naive and the sophisticated agent. The two agents have the same utility
functions and thus the same period 0 optimal consumption paths.
The diﬀerence between the naive and the sophisticated agent is that the naive agent is
unaware of his own time inconsistency. He believes every period that his future preferences
will be identical to his present preferences, and therefore that he will act tomorrow according
to what seems optimal today. However, since he is in fact time inconsistent, when tomorrow
comes he changes his mind and acts according to the intertemporal preferences as seen from
that period.
The sophisticated agent is, however, aware of his own time inconsistency. He knows that
what is optimal today may not seem optimal tomorrow. In fact, he is able to accurately
predict his future preferences. He acts according to what he knows about his own future
behavior. The sophisticated consumer does not, as the naive agent, hold the illusion in
period t that he will act in period t+ 1 according to what seems optimal in period t. Rather,
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(a) Preferred consumption paths
(b) Actual consumption path
Figure 3.3: Consumption paths periods t to t+ 3
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the sophisticated agent acts in every period as if there is a diﬀerent player in each period
and uses backward induction to choose his actions. The sophisticated agent would like to
restrict his future selves to follow the current optimal consumption path or some path closer
to it. A commitment device, allowing him to inﬂuence the actions of his future selves by
restricting their choice set, will therefore increase his long run utility. In order to restrict his
future selves and overcome (some of) his self control problems, he will be willing to pay for
a commitment device.
There is scope for improving welfare for both agents. The sophisticated and the naive
agents behave diﬀerently despite the same preferences, and thus they also respond diﬀerently
to regulations, which I will come back to in the next chapter. Some public regulations form
commitment opportunities to the agent and will only improve welfare for the sophisticated
agent. However, to the naive agent, the only possible policies to improve welfare are paternal-
istic policies forcing them towards their optimal consumption paths, as the naive agents are
not aware of their problem and will not demand any restrictions on their own consumption
behavior.
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Chapter 4
How to regulate alcohol?
In this chapter, I discuss some regulations that may improve welfare when there are negative
externalities from alcohol consumption or when consumers have self control problems. They
are all restrictions on access, and I sort the regulations into three categories: restrictions on
price, time, and location.
4.1 Price
I ﬁrst look at how taxes can be used to correct the market under negative externalities from
consumption. Externality correcting taxes are generally referred to as Pigouvian taxes. If
there are external costs from alcohol consumption, and we are aware of them, it is possible
to set taxes to achieve the social optimum as described in Chapter 3. The idea of Pigouvian
taxation is to force the consumers to internalize the external costs from their consumption.
Remember that I assumed that the externality was constant per unit consumed and equal
to α. In the social optimum the social marginal cost equals the social marginal beneﬁt:
u′(ci)− α = p. (4.1)
In the unregulated market, however, consumer i only takes account of the marginal cost
from consumption that he faces, namely the price p. If the government set a per unit tax τ
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Figure 4.1: Pigouvian tax
Social and private marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost with a negative consumption externality from alcohol
consumption. Optimal Pigouvian tax rate τ leads to the social optimal quantity q∗
equal to the external cost α, the consumer will consume until
u′(ci) = p+ τ. (4.2)
When τ = α, equations (4.1) and (4.2) are the same. τ = α therefore gives the social
optimum. This is shown in Figure 4.1. It is possible to set the tax rate such that the marginal
cost faced by the consumers is exactly so that they choose the optimal consumption level.
With this tax in place, we see that the new, regulated market equilibrium gives us the optimal
consumption q∗. The tax makes the consumer internalize the external costs. By setting the
tax correctly the consumer will have to pay for the marginal damage he causes all other
individuals by consuming alcohol.
In practice, however, this is not as easy. First, it might be hard to estimate the actual
external costs from alcohol consumption. Second, even if we do know the actual external
costs from drinking alcohol, they probably vary between consumers. There may be some
consumers that society is especially concerned to keep away from drinking for diﬀerent rea-
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sons. For instance people who drive or pregnant women. External costs are also likely to be
non-linear in consumption. It might be, for instance, that only alcohol consumption above
some threshold level causes negative externalities, and that this threshold varies between con-
sumers. In the model above this could be shown by giving the external cost α subscript i to
capture the fact that it is individual. We could also allow the external costs to be a function
of consumption and allow this function to vary between consumers. The external cost would
then be αi(ci). In the model, it would be possible to set individual taxes to achieve optimal
consumption for all individuals. Taxes for each individual i would then have to be set equal
to the marginal external cost of his consumption at his socially optimal consumption level c∗i .
This would be obtained by setting τi = α′i(c
∗
i ) for all i. For the Pigouvian taxation to work
perfectly it would then have to be a personalized tax. However, in practice, a personalized
tax is hard to implement for both practical, political and ethical reasons.
4.2 Time restrictions
A rational agent with time consistent preferences should not change consumption pattern
due to restrictions on times for alcohol sales, as long as these are inside a time frame when
he prefers to shop and storage costs are not too large (Hinnosaar, 2012). He will simply buy
what he plans to consume for the next few days or weeks and consume as planned. One could
argue that time restrictions increases the cost to the time consistent consumer because he
may have to go shopping at other times than what he prefers. However, this is only true if
he never prefers to shop inside the allowed times for alcohol sales. Otherwise he could simply
stock up. To the time consistent consumer time restrictions could reduce welfare since it
reduces his choice set, but it should not cause (much) changes in his consumption. It is
therefore not an eﬀective way to restrict alcohol consumption if agents are time consistent.
For the time inconsistent consumer, however, time restrictions may matter. Let us assume
alcohol sales are prohibited on some day, say Sundays. First, let us think of how this aﬀects
a naive time inconsistent consumer. Time restrictions may have no eﬀect or a large eﬀect
on the naive agent's alcohol consumption depending on his shopping pattern. If he usually
goes shopping every day and buys what he wishes to consume on that day, he will buy in
advance what he expects to consume on Sundays. However, on Saturdays his beliefs about
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his Sunday consumption wishes are false. Using the model described above, when Sunday
comes he actually wishes to consume more than what he had expected the day before. Since
he was not able to foresee this, he did not shop enough and he is not able to consume more
than what he had planned for. He regrets buying too little. Still, this restriction may have
increased his welfare from the period 0 perspective, because it made him stick with his plan
although he did not want to. Time restrictions can thus be welfare improving to the naive
agent, but it is involuntary and works in a paternalistic way as he himself does not see the
need for the restrictions. For a diﬀerent shopping pattern, time restrictions may have no
eﬀect. For instance, he may shop for a few days every time he shops and go back to the store
as often as necessary. Since his beliefs about future consumption are false he will always
have to go shopping again sooner than expected. But as long as the last day before he has
to stock up is never a Sunday, the restriction does not aﬀect his consumption.
The sophisticated agent can actively use time restrictions as a commitment device. He is
aware of his self control problems and uses the time restrictions as a way of limiting the choice
set of his future selves. By not buying more on Saturdays than what he plans to consume
on Sunday, he makes it impossible for his Sunday-self to deviate from his plan and consume
too much from the Saturday-self perspective. For the sophisticated agent the commitment
will always work, since he actively uses it to his advantage. He can plan his shopping trips
so as to ensure that on Sundays his alcohol stock is exactly what he wants his Sunday-self to
consume.
I have focused on alcohol sales for oﬀ premise consumption in this discussion since that
is the main topic of my empirical investigation. However, we could of course use a similar
logic for time restrictions on on premise alcohol sales. It then seems natural to think of the
time periods as some period shorter than a day and assume that the future cost of present
consumption occurs some periods later. Let us think of limits on closing hours for bars. For
the naive agent this restriction again works merely as a paternalistic policy and could either
reduce his consumption or leave it unchanged. He plans his arrival at the bar so that he will
be able to drink the amount he prefers in the remaining open hours. However, when planning
to go to the bar, the naive agent is not able to accurately foresee how much he will want to
drink, since the consumption decision takes place in the future. Since he under estimates his
the consumption preferences of his future self, he may arrive at the bar too late to be able
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to drink as much as his future self prefers. If his future self is done drinking before the bar
closes, the restriction has no eﬀect on his consumption. If at the time of closing he would
prefer to continue drinking, however, his consumption is reduced due to the restriction.
For the sophisticated agent the policy can again be used intentionally as a commitment
device and help him reduce his consumption. The sophisticated agent wants to go to the bar
and drink some amount and nothing more. However, he knows that at the bar his preferences
look diﬀerent and he will want to consume more. Since he knows that the bar closes at some
point, he can then time his arrival so that his future self only has limited time to spend at
the bar and is only able to consume the amount that his current self plans.
4.3 Location
Licensing systems is a frequently used alcohol policy. Alcohol is then geographically re-
stricted, and some consumers may have a considerable travel distance to their nearest alcohol
outlet. This entails a cost to consumers as they need to pay for gas or public transport and
there are opportunity costs from the time they spend on travel. The travel cost per unit
decreases with the amount bought per shopping trip.
Now, let us assume that there are also some storage costs. Otherwise the travel distance
tax could be reduced to almost zero per unit by buying a lifetime supply of alcohol at once.
There might, of course, be other obstacles to doing that, for instance liquidity problems.
I denote the storage costs per unit by λ(x, c). The storage cost per unit is a function of
how much alcohol you buy, x, and your consumption level, c. The more you consume (the
higher is c) the shorter you will have to store the goods you buy, and the lower is therefore
the storage cost per unit of alcohol you buy. Furthermore the more you buy, that is the
higher is x, the higher is the storage cost per unit since each unit will have to be stored for
a longer time period. The ﬁrst units of alcohol bought do not cause a storage cost, since
they are immediately consumed. For a high consumption individual the amount of alcohol
which does not entail a storage cost, because it is immediately consumed, is larger than for
a low consumption individual. When buying more alcohol than for immediate consumption,
the storage costs per unit start to rise. The more you buy the longer is the mean storage
time per unit and the higher is therefore the per unit storage cost. The per unit storage cost
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Figure 4.2: All costs
Per unit travel costs, storage costs and price for a high and low consumption individual
rises more quickly for the low consumption individual. Since he consumes less of what he has
bought every day, he will have to store every alcohol unit longer than the high consumption
individual.
Figure 4.2 shows the travel cost, price, and storage costs per unit bought. The storage
costs are drawn for a high consumption individual, λ(x, cH), and for a low consumption
individual, λ(x, cL). I assume they start out with the same stock of alcohol at home. The
storage costs are drawn on top of the price. The travel cost per unit T
x
is decreasing in the
amount of alcohol bought, since there is a ﬁxed cost per trip to the alcohol outlet. The more
you buy, the lower the price per unit. The total costs per unit of alcohol bought for a high
and a low consumption individual are shown graphically in Figure 4.3. As is evident from
the ﬁgure, there is now a unique cost minimizing amount of alcohol bought per trip for each
consumption level (and each travel distance).
For a time consistent consumer the travel distance works similar to a tax. There is an
extra cost of acquiring alcohol due to the travel distance. He will then adjust his shopping
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Figure 4.3: Total per unit cost of alcohol
Total per unit costs for a high and low consumption individual
pattern so that he buys the amount which minimizes his per unit cost. That is, he will buy
either xˆL or xˆH depending on his consumption level. The travel tax is his excess cost per
unit due to the travel and storage costs. For a low consumption individual this is cˆL − p.
For the time inconsistent consumers, however, the travel distance works in a diﬀerent way.
Let us ﬁrst discuss the naive. I assume that the agents are either high or low consumers. The
naive agent believes he is a low consumer and shops accordingly. He shops xˆL to minimize
the cost of what he believes to be his consumption. However, his future selves are in fact high
consumers, and the cost minimizing amount would therefore be xˆH . His actual per unit cost
of buying xˆL is cN , rather than cˆL as he was expecting. He buys too little according to what
he consumes as he has put too much weight on the storage costs believing what he buys will
be stored longer than it will. Since he is not able to plan accurately, he pays a higher per unit
price than he would have, had he been able to plan accurately. However, his actual costs are
lower that what he estimates while in the store due to saved storage costs. The travel tax
is higher for a naive time inconsistent consumer than for a time consistent consumer of the
same consumption type because the naive time inconsistent consumer is not able to buy the
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cost minimizing amount. Since he pays a travel tax on alcohol due to location restrictions
he consumes less.
In contrast, the sophisticated time inconsistent consumer knows his actual consumption
type, and he is therefore able to minimize his cost if he wants to. However, he is interested in
restricting his future selves and can use the travel tax as a commitment device. Since the
cost of shopping is always borne today while some of the beneﬁts (not having to travel every
time you want to consume) occur in future periods, it will always be tempting to postpone
the shopping trip. Now, let us assume that there is some critical alcohol stock X¯ > 0. When
the agent's alcohol stock reaches this level, he will ﬁnd it worthwhile to go to the store. Let
us assume that the agent's per day consumption c > X¯. This means that the agent will be
willing to accept lower consumption today than what he ﬁnds optimal in order to postpone
the shopping trip to the future. Knowing this, the sophisticated agent can plan his shopping
so that he has a low but suﬃcient amount on the last day. That is, an amount which is higher
than the critical amount, X¯, in order to keep him from buying more immediately, but lower
than c which is what he will consume if he gets the chance. This way the sophisticated agent
can force his future self to consume less than c, but he is not able to force the consumption
all the way down to X¯. The sophisticated agent can then at a price restrict the behavior of
his future selves. The price he pays is the cost increase from not buying the cost minimizing
amount, xˆ, but rather an amount in the neighborhood of xˆ ensuring that his alcohol stock
on the last day is strictly between c and X¯.
If the travel distance is quite short, so that the cost minimizing amount xˆ is not very far
away from his daily consumption c and shopping trips are quite frequent, the commitment
device oﬀered by the travel tax could actually help him reduce his consumption considerably.
If, for instance, he goes shopping every other day, he can buy enough for today's consumption
and just enough, slightly more than X¯, to keep his tomorrow self from buying more. The
travel tax helps the sophisticated agent consume less. Even with very low monetary travel
costs, there might still be a mental cost from having to travel to an alcohol outlet in which
case the sophisticated agent can still use this mental cost to his advantage. Knowing his
future self would rather not be bothered to go to the shop, he can give his futures self just
enough alcohol to abstain from shopping.
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4.4 Further remarks
The restrictions on price, time, and location respectively, work diﬀerently depending on the
assumptions we make about the consumers. Taxes are the same for everyone and may be
harder for the consumers to avoid relative to the time and location restrictions. This is
an advantage when dealing with externalities because the very nature of the external cost
makes the consumer unwilling to adjust his consumption in order to reduce the externalities.
Another advantage of taxation relative to the other restrictions is that it generates revenue to
the government. This in turn leads to less need to generate revenues using other distortionary
taxes which could further improve welfare. A time consistent consumer should prefer a
monetary tax over a travel tax of the same size.
Location restrictions diﬀer between consumers depending on where they live. This could
make it hard to target the right individuals with a travel distance tax. Assume we want
to target high consumption individuals because they generate a higher external cost from
consumption. There may be no systematic relationship between the travel tax and the
consumption level of individuals. The travel tax is then not able to target the high consumers
speciﬁcally. Furthermore, high consumption individuals could choose to live close to an outlet
in order to reduce the cost of alcohol. If this is the case, the travel tax would actually aﬀect
the high consumers, who we wished to target, to a lesser extent.
However, the ﬂexibility of the travel tax to some extent allows diﬀerent consumers to
impose diﬀerent tax levels on them selves. This in turn could be an advantage when dealing
with sophisticated time inconsistent consumers relative to the monetary tax which aﬀects
everyone the same. Sophisticated agents may to some extent choose their tax level according
to what is necessary in order to overcome their self control problems. The choice of where to
live could in itself be a commitment device. Sophisticated agents could choose to live further
away from alcohol outlets in order to impose a higher travel tax on themselves and restrict
their future consumption.
Time and location restrictions form commitment devices to the sophisticated time incon-
sistent agent helping him to partially solve his self control problems. O'Donoghue and Rabin
(1999) make an interesting point about addiction and commitment devices. The existence
of a commitment device could actually lead to increased consumption for the sophisticated
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agent. Alcohol is a potentially addictive commodity, but it is also appreciated by the con-
sumer. Let us assume that from the period 0 perspective a moderate consumption is optimal.
If the cost or risk of addiction is high enough, the sophisticated time inconsistent consumer
may abstain from consumption all together in fear of addiction. If the sophisticated agent
has a commitment device, however, he is able to reduce the consumption of his future selves
and a potential addiction would therefore not be as bad. Since he is able to reduce the
consequences of a potential addiction, the threat of addiction is not as daunting. According
to O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999, p. 119) it is even possible to construct models where
addictive goods are Giﬀen goods. Alcohol consumption could then be increasing in the price
because high costs of alcohol form a commitment device to the sophisticated consumers.
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Chapter 5
Consumption and regulation in Norway
In the previous chapters I have discussed adverse eﬀects of alcohol consumption, when alcohol
regulations may be welfare improving, and how these regulations work. In the second part of
this thesis, I turn to testing one of the predictions of Chapter 4 empirically. The prediction is
that higher travel times to the nearest alcohol outlet will lead to lower alcohol consumption.
A lot of research has been done on the eﬀects of alcohol policy, though the outcome
variable is often crime or health indicators rather than consumption. Popova et al. (2009)
performed a meta study of the eﬀects of availability of alcohol, based on 59 articles published
between 2000 and 2008. The articles included look at eﬀects of density of alcohol outlets on
alcohol consumption, drinking patterns, and damage caused by alcohol. Most of the articles
reviewed did not look at consumption and drinking pattern speciﬁcally but rather on other
damage variables. However, they look at 13 studies where drinking pattern or consumption
was examined. In the research reviewed alcohol outlet density was associated with higher
alcohol consumption, higher frequency of drinking, as well as higher quantities consumed on
each occasion.
Norström and Skog (2005) investigate the eﬀect on alcohol sales of introducing Saturday
sales from the Swedish alcohol monopoly outlets. In February 2000, Saturday openings were
introduced in six counties in Sweden, and it was implemented in the rest of Sweden 17 months
later. They regress the sales in the experimental regions on sales in the control regions and
use a dummy equal to one after the partial implementation of Saturday sales. They then
include a second dummy equal to one after the national implementation. They estimate that
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the partial implementation of Saturday open alcohol outlets led to a 3.7 percent increase in
total alcohol sales, and the national implementation led to a 3.6 percent increase in total
alcohol sales.
Nilsson (2008) investigates the Swedish strong beer experiment in 1967-68. The exper-
iment allowed for sales of strong beer from grocery stores in two Swedish regions, whereas
before and after the experiment and in other Swedish regions, only beverages with alcohol
content below 3.5 percent could be sold from grocery stores. This thus increased availability
of strong beer. Consumption of strong beer increased almost tenfold in the experimental
regions during the experiment. It fell back after the experiment but to a higher level than
the pre experiment level. Liquor consumption decreased more in the experimental regions
and wine sales increased less relative to the rest of the country, suggesting substitution from
liquor and wine to strong beer. The relative decline in liquor and wine, however, did not
compensate for the increase in strong beer.
In this chapter I present the historical and institutional background for alcohol consump-
tion and regulation in Norway.
5.1 Historical background
Before World War 2
Alcohol has been consumed and condemned since ancient times1. Already in the old Norwe-
gian scripture Håvamål, there are warnings against excessive consumption of alcohol. It has
been estimated that the production of grain in the 12th century was around 150 kilos per per-
son. In the face of widespread food shortages, beer was likely a luxury commodity restricted
to festivities. Wine was even rarer. In the 16th century, alcohol consumption in Norway
became more widespread, especially among the higher classes of society. Alcoholic beverages
other than beer were not common in Norway before the 17th century, when liquor had its
breakthrough. In the 16th and 17th centuries, restrictions on alcohol were mainly regulating
consumption in speciﬁc situations, for example on holidays or before church service.
In the 18th century, famines made it increasingly necessary to use grain and potatoes
1This section is based on Hauge (1996) and NOU (1995) unless otherwise speciﬁed.
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for foods rather than liquor production. Using grain for liquor production was repeatedly
prohibited during bad years for farming, and in 1757 a general ban on the production of
liquor was introduced. Alcohol sales outside the cities were banned, though licenses could
be granted. The ban on alcohol production was lifted in the cities in 1792. In 1816, the ban
was lifted for the rest of the country, and a liberal policy towards alcohol production and
sales was adopted. These policies were justiﬁed using arguments of free trade and liberalism.
Little thought was put into social aspects of alcohol consumption. Alcohol consumption grew
and reached a peak of 13 liters of pure alcohol per person in the 1830s. At that time, liquor
accounted for 80-90 percent of the total alcohol consumption.
As a response to the increase in alcohol consumption, diﬀerent taxes were introduced in the
1820s and 1830s. A tax was ﬁrst placed on the size of the boilers used for liquor production.
Later, a tax was placed on small scale liquor sales in order to target consumption rather
than production. However, this tax was easy to get around as people could go together and
buy larger quantities. A license system for on premise liquor sales was introduced, and the
municipalities were given the rights to determine the number of licenses. In the 1840s, liquor
production was banned for half the year (the summer half). Liquor production was then
heavily taxed to the degree that for all practical purposes home production of liquor was
banned. It was decided that liquor sales could not be combined with the sales of other goods.
The rationale behind this decision was that otherwise taxes would be less eﬀective as a policy
tool, since it would be possible to set low prices on liquor in order to attract customers who
would then spend money on other goods.
In the 1830s, a moderation movement emerged and was later replaced by an abstinence
movement. The moderation movement had argued that beer and wine were positive alterna-
tives to liquor. In the period after the 1850s, however, beer and wine were viewed in much the
same way as liquor, and restrictions on beer and wine emerged. Taxes were placed on oﬀ and
on premise sales of beer and wine in the 1850s. A tax was placed on the amount of malt used
in production of beer which led to a considerable price increase. The malt tax was replaced
by a beer tax graded by alcohol content in 1913 (NOU, 2007). In 1869, a general license sys-
tem for all alcoholic beverages for on premise consumption was introduced, and a municipal
license system for oﬀ premise beer and wine sales followed in 1882. A scheme for alcohol
sales called samlag was introduced in 1871. Samlag were corporations with permission to
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sell liquor for on and oﬀ premise consumption in its municipality, where the whole proﬁt was
to go to charitable purposes within the municipality. With the samlag system, a principle of
the absence of economic interests in alcohol sales were introduced. The system functioned in
parallel with private licenses, though few new licenses were issued in cities where samlag was
established. Local referendums were to decide whether a municipality should give licenses to
any alcohol sales.
During the ﬁrst world war, import possibilities were limited, and the need for self suf-
ﬁciency increased. Temporary bans were placed on liquor, wine, and beer. When the war
ended, people had become accustomed to the ban on alcohol. A referendum in 1919 voted
for a continued ban of liquor and fortiﬁed wine. It was decided that all wine imports should
happen through a state monopoly, and Vinmonopolet AS was established in 1922. Wine
sales could take place through Vinmonopolet or the established liquor samlag. In 1926, a
new referendum voted to remove the ban on liquor and fortiﬁed wine. After the referendum,
Vinmonopolet AS was given the sole right to sell fortiﬁed wine and liquor. Samlag existed
until 1938 when Vinmonopolet was also given the sole right to sell wine.
WW2-today
During the second world war, there were quotas on liquor and wine. Beer production was
also reduced, and there was a considerable decrease in alcohol consumption during the war.
Figure 5.1 shows alcohol sales per person above the age of 15 in Norway between 1946
and 2012. As is evident from the graph, alcohol sales have grown after the second world
war. The increase in alcohol sales during this period was driven by an increase in wine and
beer sales. Liquor sales have decreased and are now at a lower level than right after the war.
Total sales reached a peak in 1980 and fell gradually in the 1980s and early 1990s before it
started to rise again. Between 1993 and 2001, alcohol sales increased by 20 percent. In the
last few years, sales have started to decline again (NOU, 2003).
In 1989, a new law regulating alcohol took eﬀect, and the local referendums on whether
to give licenses for on and oﬀ premise alcohol sales were abolished. The new law included
a mission statement declaring its mission to limit damage caused to society and individuals
from alcohol consumption. The existing alcohol regulations are written in this law, though
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Figure 5.1: Alcohol sales in Norway 1946-2012
Notes: Alcohol sales are measured in liters of pure alcohol per person above the age of 15 years old. Source:
RusStat (SIRUS).
some changes were made to it in 1997 and took eﬀect in 1998. The changes made reduced
the scope for municipal discretion. The sales times for alcohol had previously followed the
opening hours for the particular outlets (bars, restaurants or shops) which was restricted
through diﬀerent legislation. Unless the municipalities decided otherwise, there were no
restrictions on alcohol sales beyond the opening hours of the particular outlets. The new
regulations, however, imposed maximal legal hours for oﬀ and on premise alcohol sales and
also stated normal hours. Some municipalities operated with alcohol sales at times that
after the changes in 1998 were no longer legal. For them the introduction of maximal legal
hours led to more restrictive time limits. For other municipalities, however, the changes
lead to less restrictive time limits. Some municipalities had exercised time limits on alcohol
sales before 1998 that were more restrictive than the normal time introduced but upon the
introduction of normal time limits adopted these (Hauge and Lohiniva, 2002).
Alcohol availability in the form of numbers of alcohol outlets has increased considerably
in the last decades. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show the number of municipalities without any
outlets with licenses to sell alcohol for oﬀ and on premise consumption respectively. Since
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(a) No oﬀ premise licenses (b) No on premise licenses
Figure 5.2: Number of municipalities without license for alcohol sales 1980-2012
Notes: Number of municipalities without licenses for oﬀ or on premise alcohol sales between 1980 and 2012.
Source: RusStat (SIRUS).
2002, all Norwegian municipalities have had outlets with license for oﬀ premise alcohol sales,
and in 2011 there were just 4 municipalities without any outlets with licenses for on premise
alcohol sales.
The number of Vinmonopolet outlets has more than doubled during the 20 years between
1992 and 2012. The last county in Norway to get a Vinmonopolet outlet was Sogn og Fjordane
in 1991 (Hauge, 1996). Today, 85 percent of the Norwegian population lives in a municipality
with a Vinmonopolet outlet (Vinmonopolet, 2014a).
5.2 Present regulations
Alcohol is strictly regulated in Norway today, both on and oﬀ premise sales, imports, and
production2. Limiting alcohol consumption is explicitly stated as a purpose of the law as
a means of limiting the harm caused by it. Availability is restricted in many ways, both
through price, time, and location restrictions as discussed in Chapter 4.
Price restrictions are imposed primarily through taxation. Alcohol is a heavily taxed
2This section is based on Alkoholloven (1989) unless otherwise speciﬁed.
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commodity. Alcoholic beverages are taxed per liter at a rate which is increasing with the
alcohol content of the beverage. An illustrative example from Vinmonopolet's web pages
show that alcohol taxes constitute almost two thirds of the retail price for liquor compared
to circa 40 percent and 25 percent of the retail price on wine and beer respectively. The Value
Added Tax is calculated on top of the alcohol tax. Taxes are not the only restrictions on price
however. It is illegal to use discounts on alcohol for oﬀ premise alcohol sales (Vinmonopolet,
2014b, Toll og Avgiftsdirektoratet, 2013).
Location restrictions are imposed by means of a license system and an oﬀ premise alcohol
monopoly (Vinmonopolet). Producing or selling alcohol for on or oﬀ premise consumption
is illegal unless a license is obtained. Only Vinmonopolet outlets are allowed to sell alcoholic
beverages with alcohol contents above 4.7 percent by volume. For all on premise alcohol
sales and oﬀ premise alcohol sales for lower alcohol content beverages, a license is required.
There is scope for considerable municipal discretion. The municipalities can decide the
maximum number of Vinmonopolet outlets in their municipality and approve their location.
Furthermore, licenses to sell alcohol for on and oﬀ premise consumption are granted by the
municipalities. The municipalities can decide whether and how many licenses to issue as well
as on what terms these are issued. For instance, serving food could be a requirement for on
premise alcohol sales.
Time restrictions are imposed on all alcohol sales. All oﬀ premise alcohol sales are pro-
hibited on Sundays as well as on some public holidays and on election days. Alcohol sales
from Vinmonopolet is allowed between 08:30 and 18:00 on weekdays and between 08:30 and
15:00 on Saturdays. No licenses can be given for oﬀ premise sales after 20:00 on weekdays
and after 18:00 on Saturdays nor for on premise beer and wine sales between 03:00 and 06:00
or on premise liquor sales between 03:00 and 13:00. However, within these maximal legal
time frames, the municipalities are free to decide the legal sales hours. All in all, though the
maximum legal hours stated in the law puts some limitations on the municipal autonomy,
there is scope for considerable municipal variety.
The legal drinking age is 18 for beer and wine and 20 for liquor, and it is illegal to buy
alcohol for minors. The highest legal blood alcohol concentration when driving is 2 per mile
(Vegtraﬁkkloven, 1965). Advertisement for alcoholic beverages is illegal. It is also illegal to
sell alcohol to customers who are intoxicated, and alcohol consumption in public space is
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Figure 5.3: Alcohol sales in Europe 2010
Notes: Total alcohol sales measured in liters of pure alcohol per person. Source: RusStat (SIRUS).
prohibited.
5.3 Drinking pattern in Norway
Figure 5.3 shows alcohol sales in liters of pure alcohol per person in European countries3.
As is evident from the ﬁgure, alcohol sales in Norway are the lowest in Europe, despite the
increase in Norwegian alcohol sales since the second world war.
According to Horverak and Bye (2007), the 10 percent highest alcohol consumers in
Norway accounted for 46 percent of the total consumption in 2004, while the 50 percent
with the lowest consumption accounted for only 6.2 percent of the total consumption. This
indicates that alcohol consumption varies a lot between individuals. There are some problems
in obtaining data on drinking patterns however. People systematically under-report own
consumption, and the sample may not be representative with respect to alcohol consumption.
3Note that the numbers deviate from the numbers in Figure 5.1 because Figure 5.1 shows alcohol sales in
liters of pure alcohol per person above the age of 15.
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However, surveys have been performed by SIRUS (and it's predecessor Statens institutt
for alkoholforskning) about every ﬁfth year since 1962 with some shorter and some longer
intervals. These surveys indicate some interesting patterns, where we might hope that the
bias in the measures is not changing too much over time. Alcohol consumption in Norway is
concentrated around the weekends (Fridays and Saturdays), with low and even consumption
during the week. A similar pattern exists in the other Nordic countries. This is in contrast
to southern European countries, where alcohol consumption tends to be more spread out and
in conjunction with meals (Storvoll et al., 2010).
Alcohol consumption also varies between demographic groups. Strand and Steiro (2003)
use Norwegian survey data between 1993 and 2000 to look at diﬀerences in alcohol consump-
tion between diﬀerent demographic groups. They ﬁnd that male consumption is twice as high
as female consumption. They also ﬁnd that alcohol consumption increases with education
and income levels for both males and females.
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Chapter 6
Data and descriptive statistics
6.1 Data
For my purposes, I would ideally want a measure of actual alcohol consumption in Norway.
Such data are hard to come by and often unreliable, and suﬃciently detailed data are not
available for Norway. Instead, I use data on alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet outlets. The
data include alcohol sold in every outlet each month between January 2000 and April 2012,
measured in liters of pure alcohol. These data are aggregated to the municipal level and
bimonthly frequency, in order to align with the data on sales through other outlets.
In order to get a measure of alcohol sales through other outlets, I use data on sales
measured in NOK from all enterprises with licenses to sell or serve alcohol, excluding Vin-
monopolet. I categorize the data into diﬀerent groups depending on the type of enterprise
determined from ﬁve digit NACE-codes. The groups are quite speciﬁc, allowing me to exclude
sales from some business categories which clearly do not sell or serve alcohol. I use the sales
data from groups such as pubs1, restaurants and cafes2, and Retail sale in non-specialized
stores with emphasis on food, beverages and tobacco3. The data could, however, include
enterprises without license to sell alcohol (not all restaurants, cafes or grocery stores have
licenses), and they do include all sales from enterprises with alcohol licenses. These data are
1The NACE-codes used are 55400, 55401 and 56301.
2The NACE-codes used are 55301 and 56101.
3The NACE-codes used are 47111, 47112 and 52110.
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on the municipality level for every two months between January 2000 and April 2012.
To construct a measure of travel times, I use data on travel distance between Norwegian
zip codes obtained from Infomap Norge AS. The data consist of travel time (in minutes)
between all Norwegian zip codes. I match the zip codes to their (current) respective mu-
nicipalities and use the mean travel time between all zip codes in one municipality and all
zip codes in a second municipality as a measure of the average travel time between the two
municipalities. I use the mean travel time between all zip codes located in a municipality as
a measure of the within municipality travel time.
A key issue in analyzing the data is to deﬁne the costumer base of the individual sales
outlets, Vinmonopolet and others. While one could in principle imagine several alternative
criteria, I here take the most immediate route. Using the travel time data and the data on
Vinmonopolet outlets in each year, I match all municipalities with their closest municipality
(in terms of travel time) where a Vinmonopolet outlet is operating. For municipalities with
an outlet this is the municipality itself. For each municipality, I next construct a variable
with the travel time to the nearest municipality with a Vinmonopolet outlet. This is deﬁned
as the travel time for customers in that municipality. The costumer base of a particular outlet
is then assumed to be the total population of municipalities to which it is matched, i.e. the
municipalities to which it is the nearest outlet. Using the deﬁnitions of the customer bases,
I construct variables for per person sales by dividing the total sales by the total population
in the customer bases.
I use municipal characteristics from Statistikkbanken at www.ssb.no, as listed in Table
6.1. These include population, education, and income characteristics. The population data
are quarterly, and education and income data are yearly. Using the deﬁnition of the customer
base, I construct the mean travel time in the customer base. This is a weighted average of the
travel time to the nearest outlet for the municipalities which are represented in the customer
base. It is weighted by the population in each municipality. To construct the customer base
for pubs, restaurants, and grocery stores, I follow an analogous approach. Since there are
grocery stores in all municipalities in all time periods, the customer group for grocery stores
is always the population in the municipality itself. Notice that I do not construct travel time
for these other sales outlets. Because we do not have any plausibly exogenous variation in
these travel times, we will not consider sales from these outlets directly, but only to assess
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Table 6.1: Control variables used in the regressions
Variable Description Source
meaninc Mean income Statistikkbanken
No. 03068
GS Share of the population with primary school as the
highest obtained education
Statistikkbanken
No. 09429
VG Share of the population with high school as the
highest obtained education
Statistikkbanken
No. 09429
uni_k Share of the population with higher education less
than four years as the highest obtained education
Statistikkbanken
No. 09429
substitution eﬀects from openings of new Vinmonopolet outlets.
Since I control for characteristics in the customer base, I have constructed weighted means
of the controls for the municipalities in the customer base. The means are again weighted by
the population in the respective municipalities.
There have been some changes in the municipalities during the period. Some munici-
palities have merged, and some have had changes in the municipality ID numbers. I have
restructured the data so that it includes only the current municipalities in Norway by match-
ing non existing (previous) municipality ID numbers with their current municipality ID. I
have used a mean (education and income variables) or sum (population and sales) of the
merged municipalities in the period before the merge.
The ﬁnal data set includes one observation for all current Norwegian municipalities every
two months between January 2000 and April 2012. There are 74 time periods and 428
municipalities in the data set, in total 31 672 observations. Each observation includes a
municipality ID, time variables, liters of pure alcohol sold from Vinmonopolet, sales (in NOK)
for restaurants, pubs, and grocery stores, total population, mean travel time to the nearest
Vinmonopolet outlet for the customer bases, and the weighted mean of the control variables
for the respective customer bases. Remember that the customer bases can diﬀer between
Vinmonopolet, pubs, restaurants, and grocery stores in the same municipality. There are in
total 11 495 observations of municipalities with a Vinmonopolet outlet and 31 672, 28 422
and 8 267 observations of municipalities with positive sales in grocery stores, restaurants,
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and pubs respectively. All variables regarding the customer bases for Vinmonopolet, pubs,
and restaurants (travel time, education, population, and income) are missing if there is no
outlet of the respective type.
6.2 Descriptive statistics
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show mean and standard deviations for the main outcomes and the ex-
planatory and control variables included in my analysis in the years 2000 and 2010. Sales
per two months at Vinmonopolet averages at 0.28 liters of pure alcohol in 2000 and 0.40 in
2010. There is considerable variation across municipalities. The range in per person sales
from Vinmonopolet in the year 2000 is from 0.02 to 0.87 liters, with a standard deviation of
0.12.
In year 2000, sales per person in grocery stores, restaurants, and bars averages at 3 242,
327, and 30 NOK, respectively. In 2010, the corresponding numbers are 4 878, 438, and 45.
Figure 6.1 shows per person sales from Vinmonopolet and total sales from grocery stores,
restaurants, and bars over time. The data display a clear seasonal pattern. Total alcohol
sales are highest in the last two months of the year, with the holiday season, new year, and
traditional end-of-year gatherings, and during the summer. The lowest total sales are in the
ﬁrst two months of the year. To get a clearer picture of the aggregate trend over the period,
I also include a moving average process, that smooths out the seasonal variations. The ﬁgure
documents a considerable rise in sales over the period from all outlets. Sales at Vinmonopolet
grows from under 1.8 liters per capita in 2000 to almost 2.5 liters per capita in 2010, where it
seems to stabilize. Sales at grocery stores and restaurants both grow by over 60%, while sales
in bars more than doubles. One should note that sales in grocery stores are substantially
higher than sales in bars or restaurants. Sales in grocery stores will thus account for a large
fraction of the total sales in the three categories.
From Table 6.2, we also ﬁnd that the customer bases of Vinmonopolet outlets and the
travel time to this outlet for the customer base, varies considerably across municipalities. In
2000, the average customer base consists of about 46 190 individuals, but ranged from under
3 500 to over 500 000. In the same year, mean travel time was on average 34.5 minutes, and
and below 105 minutes for all outlets. The mean value of both the customer bases and the
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics, outcome variables
Outcome variables 2000 2010
Sales per person from: N Mean SD N Mean SD
Vinmonopolet (liters) 582 0.28 0.12 1 188 0.40 0.17
Grocery stores (NOK) 2 568 3 242 932 2 568 4 878 1 493
Restaurants (NOK) 2 350 327 321 2 271 438 632
Bars (NOK) 565 30.4 41.9 708 44.7 71.5
Notes: Sales are measured per capita in the customer base of the outlet. Sales at Vinmonopolet is
measured in liters of pure alcohol. Sales from other outlets are measured in NOK.
Table 6.3: Summary statistics, explanatory variables and control variables
Variable 2000 2010
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Customer base 582 46 190 61 603 1 188 24 653 49 295
Travel time 582 34.45 20.47 1 188 26.34 18.00
Income 582 219 406 28 488 1 188 333 585 32 728
Primary school 582 0.376 0.055 1 188 0.324 0.054
High school 582 0.452 0.033 1 188 0.454 0.040
Higher education 582 0.149 0.034 1 188 0.180 0.036
Notes: Customer base is the total population in the municipalities included in the customer bases of each
municipality with a Vinmonopolet outlet. Travel time is the weighted mean travel time in minutes for the
municipalities included in the customer bases of each municipality with a Vinmonopolet outlet. Income is
measured in NOK. Primary school, high school and higher education are the fractions of the population
with the diﬀerent education levels as their highest obtained education.
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Figure 6.1: Total sales from Vinmonopolet
Notes: Numbers are in liters of pure alcohol for Vinmonopolet and in millions of NOK for grocery stores,
bars and restaurants.
travel time is lower in 2010.
The ﬁrst panel in Figure 6.2 shows how the total number of Vinmonopolet outlets evolves
from 2000 to 2012. Vinmonopolet opened 138 new outlets in 127 diﬀerent municipalities
during this period. 8 outlets in 8 municipalities were closed. 118 of the municipalities in
which an outlet has opened did not have an outlet at the beginning of the period. Of course,
as new outlets opens, the customer bases and travel times must necessarily fall. The evolution
of mean travel time in the customer bases and mean size of customer bases are shown in the
last two panels of Figure 6.2. While mean customer bases are cut in half, from almost 50 000
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Figure 6.2: Number of Vinmonopolet outlets, travel time and size of customer bases
to less than 25 000, mean travel time falls by about ten minutes, from 36 to 26 minutes.
Figure 6.3 shows a scatter plot of mean travel time and per person alcohol sales from
Vinmonopolet after I have removed time and municipality eﬀects. As is evident from the
graph, there is a clear negative relationship between mean travel time and per person alcohol
sales from Vinmonopolet, and the relationship seems to be convex.
46
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
Li
te
rs
 o
f p
ur
e 
al
co
ho
l
-20 0 20 40
Mean travel time (minutes)
(mean) r_oms_pp Fitted values
Figure 6.3: Sales per person and mean travel time
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Chapter 7
Empirical strategy
Above, I argued that travel time to the nearest alcohol outlet may aﬀect alcohol consumption,
both because it works as a tax increasing the costs of alcohol to consumers, and because it
may be intentionally used by consumers to overcome self control problems. To investigate
the prediction empirically, I now investigate how travel time to the nearest alcohol outlet
for oﬀ premise alcohol sales aﬀects alcohol consumption. As mentioned in Chapter 5, oﬀ
premise sales of alcoholic beverages with alcohol content above 4.7 percent by volume, is
only allowed from the state oﬀ premise alcohol monopoly Vinmonopolet AS. Norway is a
large country, divided by long fjords and rugged mountains. A limited number of outlets
means that some people have long travel times to their nearest Vinmonopolet outlet, and
there are considerable diﬀerences in travel times.
In order to investigate how travel time to the nearest oﬀ premise alcohol outlet aﬀects
alcohol consumption, a cross sectional analysis would not be meaningful. There may be
diﬀerences between alcohol consumption in cities and in the country side. At the same time,
travel times are likely to be higher in the country side than in cities. Instead, I look at changes
in travel times over time. I use data as described in the previous chapter from 2000 to 2012.
I exploit variation in travel time to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet, due to openings of a
number of new Vinmonopolet outlets during the period, and look at how changes in travel
time aﬀects per person sales from Vinmonopolet.
My main interest is to look at the eﬀect of travel times on alcohol consumption. If I do
ﬁnd an eﬀect of travel time on alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet this does not necessarily
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mean that alcohol consumption increases as travel times decreases. It might be that what I
ﬁnd is instead an eﬀect of people consuming alcohol from Vinmonopolet rather than through
diﬀerent channels. For this reason, I also look into the possibility of substitution between
diﬀerent channels for acquiring alcohol, by investigating the eﬀect of changes in travel times
to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet on sales in other enterprises selling alcohol.
Sales from Vinmonopolet
My main interest is the eﬀects of travel time (in minutes) on sales of alcohol, and I start with
the basic regression equation
Vi,t = αi + ρt + γTTi,t + βXi,t + i (7.1)
where Vi,t are sales from Vinmonopolet in municipality i at time t measured in liters of
pure alcohol per person in municipality i's customer base. The time period is bimonthly.
TT i,t is the weighted mean travel time to municipality i from the potential customer base of
municipality i at time t, measured in minutes. Xi,t is a vector of controls containing weighted
means of municipality level variables in the customer base. αi captures the municipality-ﬁxed
eﬀects and ρt the time-ﬁxed eﬀects. i is the error term. I cluster the standard errors at the
municipal level to account for correlated shocks in municipalities.
The parameter of interest is γ. It captures the eﬀect of changes in the mean travel time
of the customers on per person alcohol sales for the Vinmonopolet outlets. If the predictions
of Chapter 4 are correct, we would expect the coeﬃcient to be negative.
I use municipality ﬁxed eﬀects because there may be unobserved heterogeneity at the
municipality level. Alcohol sales per customer may be higher or lower in some municipalities,
and this may be correlated with the travel time of the customers. By using municipality ﬁxed
eﬀects, I control for the average diﬀerences between municipalities that are constant over
time, reducing the risk of omitted variables bias. Using ﬁxed eﬀects, we are in eﬀect relating
changes in alcohol sales to changes in travel time. I use time ﬁxed eﬀects to account for
shocks to alcohol sales that are the same across municipalities (Wooldridge, 2009, Chapter
14). This addresses, for instance, the concern about confounding the decreasing trend in
travel times with the increasing trend in alcohol sales, or openings of Vinmonopolet outlets
49
being correlated with the seasonal pattern in alcohol sales. In addition, I include controls for
the education and income of the customer bases to account for diﬀering demographic trends
across municipalities.
Substitution
As previously mentioned, a negative eﬀect of travel time on alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet
does not necessarily mean that alcohol consumption increases as travel time decreases. It
might be that what I ﬁnd is instead an eﬀect of people consuming alcohol from Vinmonopolet
rather than through diﬀerent channels. To investigate the possibility of substitution, I look at
how the travel time to Vinmonopolet outlets aﬀects sales in other enterprises selling alcohol.
This is implemented by estimating equation (7.1) after replacing the dependent variable with
sales from the other outlets. The outcome variable is either sales per person from pubs, sales
per person from restaurants and cafes, sales per person from grocery stores or total sales
per person from all outlets in the three categories. They are measured in Norwegian kroner
(NOK) per person in the customer group.
Notice that the travel time is to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet, so we now expect
γ to be positive if sales are substitutes to sales from Vinmonopolet outlets. Notice also
that the customer bases are deﬁned for the particular outlets. The customer bases for pubs,
restaurants, and grocery stores in the same municipality may diﬀer. The customer base of the
grocery stores are always restricted to the municipalities themselves since all municipalities
have observations for grocery store sales in all time periods. In the grocery store and total
regression, I therefore use controls for the municipality.
If alcohol sales through other channels than Vinmonopolet respond to the changes in
travel time to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet caused by the openings of new outlets, this is
an indication of substitution: people drink less through other channels as the availability of
alcohol through Vinmonopolet increases, or potentially complementarity: people drink more
at pubs and restaurants as availability through Vinmonopolet increases.
It should be noted that the data I use for these regressions are quite rough. They capture
all sales within their categories. Sales from shops, cafes, and restaurants without licenses
are included and so is sales from other sources than alcohol sales within the categories.
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Since alcohol sales may constitute only a small part of total sales, we might see only small
relative changes in the sales numbers, even if there are considerable changes in alcohol sales.
Furthermore, alcohol sales as share of the total sales likely diﬀers between the four categories.
For this reason, I look at the changes in sales in levels rather than the relative changes. As long
as non-alcohol sales are not correlated with the travel times, the roughness of the numbers
should not bias the estimates.
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Chapter 8
Main results
Sales from Vinmonopolet
The main estimate for how travel times to Vinmonopolet aﬀects sales of alcohol through
Vinmonopolet are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 8.1. The estimate of γ is -0.006
and is highly signiﬁcant. From Figure 6.2, it was evident that the mean travel time to
Vinmonopolet outlets from their customer bases decreased by almost ten minutes during the
period I investigate. If mean travel time in the customer base decreases by ten minutes,
the model predicts an increase in sales per person every two months of 0.06 liters of pure
alcohol. This corresponds to a yearly increase of 0.36 liters of pure alcohol. Between 2000 and
2010, an average of 4.85 liters of pure alcohol was sold per person each year from all (legal)
sources1. An increase of 0.36 liters of pure alcohol then constitutes a 7.4 percent increase in
alcohol sold. This suggests that the decrease in travel time since year 2000 accounts for a
non-negligible part of the 30 percent increase in alcohol sales over the period.
From Figure 6.3, it looked like the relationship between travel time and per person alcohol
sales might be non-linear. This seems intuitively plausible as well. For instance, there may
be a threshold level for travel time above which the alcohol outlet is perceived to be too
far away, so that people with travel times above this threshold level do not buy anything
from Vinmonopolet. For the customers with travel times above this threshold level, changes
in travel time will not aﬀect how much they buy as long as the change does not push them
1This mean in calculated using numbers from RusStat (SIRUS) from 2000 to 2010.
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Table 8.1: Main results sales from Vinmonopolet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales per person Sales per person Sales per person Sales per person
Travel time (TT) -0.006*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001)
TT^2/1000 0.089***
(0.012)
ln(TT) -0.208***
(0.022)
TT<30 mins -0.011***
(0.001)
TT 30-60 mins -0.006***
(0.001)
TT>60 mins -0.001
(0.002)
Observations 11495 11495 11495 11495
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Estimate of γ based on equation (7.1) and 8.1.
Used in all speciﬁcations are municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, time ﬁxed eﬀects and control variables listed in
Table 6.1 and meaned over the customer bases. The outcome variable is measured in liters of pure alcohol.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.
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below the threshold travel time. More generally, changes in travel time may have diﬀerent
consequences for sales depending on the initial travel time. The same absolute change in
travel times may force some people to drive rather than walk, while it may have little impact
on people that are already driving.
In order to allow for a non-linear relationship between travel time and per person alcohol
sales, I estimate a few diﬀerent speciﬁcations. First, I add travel time squared to equation
7.1. Column 2 in Table 8.1 shows the coeﬃcients of travel time and travel time squared from
this speciﬁcation. The linear and the squared coeﬃcients are -0.014 and 0.089, respectively,
and they are both highly signiﬁcant. I then predict the increase in alcohol sales from a 10
minute decrease in travel time, starting from the year 2000 mean travel time. The model
predicts an increase in yearly per person alcohol sales by 0.54 liters of pure alcohol.
Next, I estimate equation 7.1, but using the log of travel time. The estimate from this
speciﬁcation is shown in column 3 in Table 8.1. The estimate is -0.208 and again highly
signiﬁcant. Using this model, the predicted increase in yearly per person alcohol sales from
a 10 minute decrease in travel time from the year 2000 mean is 0.43 liters of pure alcohol.
One potential issue with the parametric speciﬁcations above is that they may be vulner-
able to outlier bias. I therefore use a fourth speciﬁcation, with regression equation 7.1
Vi,t = αi + ρt +
3∑
k=1
δkD
k
i,t +
3∑
k=1
γjD
k
i,t · TT i,t + βXi,t + i. (8.1)
D1 takes the value 1 if TTi,t 6 30. D2 takes the value 1 if TTi,t ∈ (30, 60]. And ﬁnally, D3
takes the value 1 if TTi,t > 60. αi, ρt, Xi,t and i are deﬁned in Chapter 7. The parameters
of interest are now γ1, γ2 and γ3. They capture the eﬀect of changes in travel time on per
person alcohol sales, for the Vinmonopolet outlets for which the mean travel time in the
customer bases are in the three respective intervals.
The results of regression equation 8.1 are presented in column 4 of Table 8.1. Estimates
conform to expectations, in that the impact of travel time is decreasing in the initial level.
The estimate of γ1, that is the eﬀect of changes in travel time on per person alcohol sales
from the outlets with mean travel time of 30 minutes or less, is -0.011 and highly signiﬁcant.
A ten minute decrease in travel time is then related to a increase in yearly per person alcohol
sales of 0.66 liters of pure alcohol. This is a 13.6 percent increase relative to the per person
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Table 8.2: Main results substitution
Groceries Restaurant Pub Total
Mean travel time -3.487∗∗∗ 0.370 -0.041 -2.849∗∗
(0.963) (0.366) (0.156) (1.027)
Observations 31612 28324 8268 31612
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Estimates of γ based on equation (7.1) using municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, time ﬁxed eﬀects and control
variables listed in Table 6.1 and meaned over the customer base. The outcome variables are sales per
person measured in NOK from grocery stores, restaurants, pubs and total sales per person. Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level
average between 2000 and 2010. The estimate of γ2 is -0.006 and again highly signiﬁcant.
When mean travel time is between 30 and 60 minutes, a ten percent decrease in mean travel
time is related to a decrease in yearly per person sales of 0.36 liters of pure alcohol. γ3 is
-0.001 and insigniﬁcant.
Substitution
The results from equation (7.1), with sales per person in grocery stores, restaurants, pubs, and
in total as the outcome variables, are presented in Table 8.2. If there is in fact substitution
between alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet and alcohol sales from grocery stores, restaurants
or bars, we would expect the coeﬃcients to be positive. People living further away from a
Vinmonopolet outlet compensate by buying more alcohol through other channels.
As is evident from Table 8.2, γ is only positive when the outcome variable is sales per per-
son in restaurants and cafes. This indicates that there might be substitution between alcohol
sales from restaurants and from Vinmonopolet. However, the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant
and it is quite small. γ is equal to 0.37. A ten minute decrease in the mean travel time to the
nearest Vinmonopolet outlet of the customer bases for the restaurants, would then entail a
decrease in yearly per person sales from restaurants and cafes of 22.2 NOK. 22.2 NOK would
perhaps pay for a quarter of a liter of beer in a restaurant. For beer with an alcohol content
of 4.5 percent by volume, this is then equivalent to 1.125 centiliters of pure alcohol per year,
or 0.01125 liters.
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When the outcome variable is per person sales from either pubs, grocery stores or total
sales per person, γ is negative. However, for pubs the estimate of γ is -0.041. A ten minute
decrease in mean travel time is then related to a 2.46 NOK decrease in per person sales
from pubs per year. This change is very small and furthermore, the estimate is insigniﬁcant.
The estimate of γ when sales in grocery stores is the outcome variable is -3.487. A ten
minute decrease in mean travel time is then related to a 209 NOK increase in yearly per
person sales from grocery stores. The estimate is highly signiﬁcant, though it is quite small.
The data show no indication of substitution between alcohol bought from grocery stores
and alcohol from Vinmonopolet, but rather of complementarity. However, as I mentioned in
Chapters 7 and 6, the outcome variables in the regressions presented in Table 8.2 include
sales from businesses within the three categories that do not have license to sell alcohol as
well as non-alcohol sales from the businesses with an alcohol license. It is not unlikely that
people who travel to get to their closest Vinmonopolet outlet also do their grocery shopping
close to the Vinmonopolet outlet even if it is not in their municipality. This could then
explain the negative relationship between grocery store sales and the travel distance to the
nearest Vinmonopolet outlet. The grocery stores close to Vinmonopolet outlets could get
more customers as other people shop there while they are in the neighborhood in order to
buy alcohol from Vinmonopolet. In this case, what is captured is a relationship between
alcohol from Vinmonopolet and groceries from the grocery stores rather than alcohol.
The coeﬃcient is again negative and signiﬁcant when the outcome variable is total per
person sales. The estimate of γ is -2.849. This is driven by the negative relationship between
grocery store sales and travel distance to the nearest Vinmonopolet outlet.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Alcohol consumption has a number of adverse eﬀects, and limiting alcohol consumption is
a stated objective of Norwegian alcohol policy. Restrictions on access are the main means
used in order to achieve this objective. Oﬀ premise alcohol sales for beverages with alcohol
contents above 4,7 percent are restricted to a state monopoly. All other alcohol sales, on
and oﬀ premise, require a license. The state monopoly and license system form geographical
restrictions on alcohol availability.
Economic theory would suggest that the travel distance to alcohol outlets matters for
alcohol consumption, both because it constitutes a cost to the consumers, and because it
forms a commitment device for time inconsistent consumers. In order to test this prediction
empirically, I use data on liters of pure alcohol sold from Vinmonopolet, combined with data
on travel times between Norwegian municipalities, to investigate the eﬀect of changes in
travel time on per person alcohol sales.
In my baseline regression I ﬁnd that a ten minute decrease in travel time is related to an
increase in yearly per person alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet of 0.36 liters of pure alcohol,
and the estimate is highly signiﬁcant. This constitutes a 7.4 percent increase in alcohol sold
relative to the year 2000-2010 mean. To allow for non-linearities in the relationship I estimate
a few other speciﬁcations giving higher predicted increases in yearly per person alcohol sales
with the highest being 0.66 liters of pure alcohol per person per year.
I also look at how sales per person in other enterprises where alcohol sales are possible
are aﬀected by the mean travel time in the customer bases to the nearest oﬀ premise state
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monopoly outlet. These include pubs, restaurants, and grocery stores. If there is substitution
between alcohol sales from the oﬀ premise state monopoly and alcohol sales from grocery
stores, restaurants or pubs, we would expect a positive relationship between travel time to
an oﬀ premise state alcohol monopoly and sales in pubs, restaurants, and grocery stores. I
ﬁnd some evidence of substitution from restaurants. However, the estimate is very small and
insigniﬁcant. For pubs and grocery stores the relationship is in fact positive and for grocery
stores it is highly signiﬁcant. This does not necessarily mean that there is complementarity.
It could rather be an eﬀect of increased non-alcoholic sales due to more favorable location
caused by the openings of Vinmonopolet outlets nearby.
I ﬁnd that per person alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet increases as the mean travel time of
the customer bases decrease. I ﬁnd some evidence of substitution from restaurants. However
the estimate is insigniﬁcant and small and only to an almost negligible degree compensates for
the increase in sales from Vinmonopolet. For pubs and grocery stores there is no indication of
substitution, the relationship is in fact negative. I conclude that decreases in travel time are
related to an increase in alcohol consumption, as alcohol sales from Vinmonopolet increases
while there is little evidence of substitution.
Some ﬁnal words of caution are in order. First, alcohol consumption may not equal the
amount of alcohol sold. Sales could diﬀer from actual consumption due to home production
of alcohol, cross border shopping (and smuggling), and tourist imports. In principle, there
could be a relationship between the time trend in travel distance to the nearest Vinmonopolet
outlet and the trend in use of these other channels. If so, then my estimates will be biased.
Second, implicit in my design is an assumption that everyone in a municipality shops in
the municipality with an outlet, with the mean shortest travel time. This is obviously not
true for everyone. The closest municipality with an outlet may vary within a municipality.
There may also be other reasons to shop in a municipality other than the nearest one, for
instance if people work in a diﬀerent municipality. It is perhaps not unlikely that there is
a relationship between the number of external shoppers, that we have assumed out of the
model, and the travel time across municipalities. Some municipalities get a lot of incoming
commuters. If these are mostly urban municipalities, where the travel distance is low, and
the people who commute there use the Vinmonopol outlets there, then there would be a
positive relationship between the number of external shoppers and the travel time. However,
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since this is unlikely to vary much over the time period I consider, this should be captured
by the municipality-ﬁxed eﬀects in the model and should not bias the results.
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